An Analysis of the Behavior of the Risk Premium in the German Deutschemark Forward Market: A Comparison of Pre- and Post-German Reunification of 1990 Exchange Rates by Newton, Paul
Western Kentucky University
TopSCHOLAR®
Masters Theses & Specialist Projects Graduate School
8-1-1994
An Analysis of the Behavior of the Risk Premium in
the German Deutschemark Forward Market: A
Comparison of Pre- and Post-German
Reunification of 1990 Exchange Rates
Paul Newton
Western Kentucky University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses
Part of the Economics Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by TopSCHOLAR®. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses & Specialist Projects by
an authorized administrator of TopSCHOLAR®. For more information, please contact connie.foster@wku.edu.
Recommended Citation
Newton, Paul, "An Analysis of the Behavior of the Risk Premium in the German Deutschemark Forward Market: A Comparison of
Pre- and Post-German Reunification of 1990 Exchange Rates" (1994). Masters Theses & Specialist Projects. Paper 947.
http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/947
AN ANALYSIS OF THE BEHAVIOR OF THE RISK PREMIUM 
IN THE GERMAN DEUTSCHEMARK FORWARD MARKET: 
A COMPARISON OF PRE- AND POST-GERMAN 
REUNIFICATION OF 1990 EXCHANGE RATES 
A Thesis 
Presented to 
the Faculty of the Department of Economics 
Western Kentucky University 
Bowling Green, Kentucky 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts 
by 
Paul Michael Newton 
August 1994 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE BEHAVIOR OF THE RISK PREMIUM 
IN THE GERMAN DEUTSCHEMARK FORWARD MARKET: 
A COMPARISON OF PRE- AND POST-GERMAN 
REUNIFICATION OF 1990 EXCHANGE RATES 
Date Recommended A u g u s t 2 3 , 1 9 9 4 
Director of Thesis M 
Lfril/vv UJ 
tjwhi 
Director of Graduate Stucfles Date 
Table of Contents 
1. Statement of Purpose Page 1 
2. Historic Background 4 
3. Literature Review 10 
4. Data Description 16 
5. Uncovered Interest Rate Parity 19 
6. Data Analysis 24 
7. Conclusion 33 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE BEHAVIOR OF THE RISK PREMIUM 
IN THE GERMAN DEUTSCHEMARK FORWARD MARKET: 
A COMPARISON OF PRE- AND POST-GERMAN 
REUNIFICATION OF 1990 EXCHANGE RATES 
Paul M. Newton August 1994 34 Pages 
Directed by: Bill Davis, Moosa Valinezhad, John C. 
Wassom 
Department of Economics: Western Kentucky University 
The German reunification of 1990 and the methods of 
economic integration exerted considerable pressure on 
both the German economy and the deutschemark. This 
thesis addresses the issue that the reunification 
undermined the stability of the deutschemark, 
detectable through a change in the implied risk 
premium. Emphasis is placed on the forward deutschemark 
in the context of interest rate parity in order to 
detect a change in the implied risk premium. By using 
three month U.S. and German bank Certificate of Deposit 
rates as the basis for the IRP calculations, a 
considerable shift in this implied risk premium was 
detected and attributed to a riskier deutschemark. 
1. Statement of Purpose 
Over the past decade, the West German economy, with 
steady growth in real GNP and low inflation, has been 
regarded as one of the world's strongest economies. Although 
paling in comparison, the East German economy was considered 
one of the stronger among Eastern Bloc nations. In October 
of 1990, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) formally ceded 
to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), creating an new 
economy made up of western ideals and technologies but 
containing considerable eastern bloc inefficiencies. 
The cession ultimately became the focus of numerous 
economic and political discussions ranging from the ability 
of the west to absorb the east to questions about inflation 
and a devaluing of the deutschemark. The latter point will 
be examined by exploring the effects of the reunification of 
Germany on the deutschemark. In particular, the existence of 
a non-zero risk premium will be determined and examined to 
ascertain whether or not any structural changes in the 
forward exchange rate model for the deutschemark can 
possibly be attributed to the reunification of Germany. 
The main reason why one may even expect any sort of 
c 
structural change in the deutschemark during the ex post 
1 
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period lies with the deliberate overvaluation of the East 
German Ostmark by the German Bundesbank. This disparity, as 
will be discussed below, was likely to be interpreted as a 
prelude to inflation in the "New Germany." The West German 
economy and, hence, the deutschemark, had long been 
considered somewhat removed from the pressures of inflation; 
it was this sudden anticipated inflation increase that could 
be expected to cause the structural change in the 
deutschemark, via the risk premium. Prior to reunification, 
investors perceived major increases in inflation as unlikely 
due to the Bundesbank's effectiveness in maintaining price 
stability. The incorporation of East into West Germany 
confronted investors with the specter of increasing 
inflation in a previously stable economy. 
This examination will be conducted on a two country 
model, Germany and the United States. Any data collected 
before the unification was West German statistics due to 
availability and accuracy considerations and because West 
Germany is more reflective of the current Germany than was 
East Germany. The U.S. Dollar was chosen for the simple fact 
that any other cross-currency trading, through arbitrage can 
be linked to include the dollar; thus, we maintain the two 
country model. 
The data that will be examined covers the period of 
March, 1973 (1973.03) to March, 1993 (1993.03). There are 
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sufficient observations prior to reunification to base any 
findings. There are also sufficient post reunification 
observations to conduct at least small sample tests. Ideally 
more observations would have been preferable; however, some 
statistical faith can be put into the findings. 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: 
In Section 2, the historical background, I address the issue 
of why one could expect a change in the risk premium to 
occur as a result of reunification. The political history of 
German reunification is touched upon in this section, and 
the specifics of the currency conversion and its effects are 
discussed. 
An examination of the relevant economic literature is 
contained in Section 3. The problem of discerning between 
the presence of a risk premium and/or the breakdown of 
rational expectations is introduced and is an integral part 
of all discussions contained in this paper. The remainder of 
the section is focused on the various theoretical models 
that have contributed to the analysis. 
A description of the data and the reasoning behind the 
chosen sample periods can be found in Section 4. Section 5 
contains a discussion of the interest rate parity which is 
the basis upon which my null hypothesis and ultimately all 
conclusions rest. 
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Section 6 contains the data analysis wherein the 
results of all tests are reported and discussed. Section 7 
is the conclusion of this paper. 
2. Historic Background 
It would not seem unreasonable to ask "why one would 
expect a change in the risk premium for the deutschemark." 
The answer lies in the fact that since the end of World War 
II, West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany - FRG) and 
East Germany (the German Democratic Republic - GDR) have 
been two totally separate states that have pursued two 
distinct economic ideologies with contrasting success. The 
free market philosophy of the FRG has undoubtedly been more 
successful that the centrally planned economy of the GDR 
with respect to real income and growth levels. Thus, with 
the incorporation of the less productive East Germany into 
the robust West German economy, one would certainly expect 
total productivity to decline. Further, when combined with 
the inherent costs of the unification (mostly subsidies) and 
inflationary threats, the deutschemark may well be 
considered a riskier currency to hold. 
The inflationary threats stem primarily from the 
expected increased monetary base that will be required to 
1) finance the exchange of ostmarks to deutschemarks at a 
considerably overvalued rate, and 2) support (mainly through 
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subsidies) the East German population and industries, even 
if only temporarily. The ensuing decrease in nominal 
interest rates would cause the deutschemark to devalue, 
relative to the rest of the world, ceteris paribus. With 
this possibility, investors would require a larger premium 
to hold deutschemarks. 
In fact, in these particular circumstances, it would 
not be unreasonable to assume the rest of Europe and 
possibly the U.S. would follow suit in an attempt to 
decrease their domestic nominal interest rates. The reason 
for such an assumption would be that the Bundesbank had 
previously maintained a high domestic interest rate, thereby 
forcing most of the major governments to also maintain a 
high interest rate in order to sustain a targeted exchange 
rate level and attract foreign capital. With their central 
banks under local pressure to reduce rates, a fall in German 
rates may allow foreign governments to reduce interest 
rates. All this considered, investors may still require a 
premium for holding deutschemarks as the increased 
uncertainty remains. 
Before becoming involved in the analysis of the 
deutschemark, it will be insightful to digress a little into 
the historical background of the reunification of Germany. 
The first free legislative elections in the GDR were 
held on March 18, 1990, and resulted in a coalition 
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government led by the Christian Democrats, who were closely 
aligned to their sister party in the FRG. The subsequent 
abolition of travel restrictions between the two states led 
to ideas and then demonstrations for a united Germany. In 
November 1989, Chancellor Helmut Kohl had presented to the 
Bundestag a 10-point plan for eventual unification of the 
two Germanies; the plan had received broad approval both 
from within West Germany's borders and from such 
instrumental players as Mikail Gorbechev and the NATO 
leaders. After promises that German borders would remain as 
they were and continued EC membership, the path for 
reunification was left entirely to agreement by the two 
Germanies. 
On the 31st of August 1990, a treaty between the GDR 
and the FRG was signed on the "Establishment of German 
Unity, " indicating the cession of the GDR to the FRG on 
October 3, 1990. According to the treaty East Germany was to 
become one with Germany and was accorded NATO and EC 
membership, - thus began the period of post reunified 
Germany. 
Underlying the political and nationalistic desire for 
unification was a certain wariness by the West Germans (and 
world financial markets) of the type of economic burden they 
would essentially be undertaking in order to truly unite 
Germany. Although the GDR was the most highly developed 
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economy in the CMEA, (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
-which included mostly Eastern Bloc nations and other 
centralized economies such as Cuba and Vietnam), combined 
with the anticipated inflow of funds and technology, the 
decentralization of industry and relatively less productive 
workers of the GDR were going to prove an economic and 
social burden to their western brethren. 
Prior to 1989 the East German economy was, by official 
estimates of real GDP, growing approximately 3-4% annually. 
By mid 1989 this rate was estimated to have declined to 1-
2%, the cause of which former Prime Minister Modrow 
attributed to the mass exodus of young and skilled workers 
to the FRG. Two thirds of all GDR foreign trade was 
conducted with CMEA partners, 40% of which was with the 
Soviet Union. Between 1988 and 1989, the GDR current account 
balance went from a western estimate of $100 million surplus 
to an official $1 billion deficit. In an economy that 
imports mostly intermediate goods and also experienced a 
decline in GDP growth, the subsequent build up of 
substandard finished goods could be construed as an 
indication of the inefficiencies of the old East German 
economy. Furthermore, the GDR national debt was growing at 
twice the rate of national income. 
After much debate and anticipation, the German 
Parliament decided (April 23, 1990) that upon unification 
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ostmarks could be converted to deutschemarks (the official 
currency of the new Germany) at the rate of 1:1. Although 
the GDR had accepted the economic and political reality that 
the market value of the ostmark was not equal to the value 
of the deutschemark, in May of 1990 the commercial value was 
still published at the rate of 1:1. A GDR-FRG travel board 
adopted a tourist rate of 3EM:1DM, and the GDR government 
even acknowledged that the economic conditions of the time 
implied an exchange rate of around 4.5:1. Black market 
transactions, which are normally more indicative of the 
intrinsic value of the ostmark than are official rates, 
allowed the deutschemark to be bought for seven or as many 
as thirteen ostmarks. 
Specifics of the currency unification were that wages 
and pensions were to be converted at the 1:1 rate. This rate 
would apply to savings and cash holdings only on a graduated 
scale according to age. GDR citizens below the age of 15 
could convert cash and savings at a rate of 1EM: 1DM up to 
2,000 ostmarks per person. For those between the ages 15-59 
4,000 ostmarks could be converted at 1:1, while citizens 60 
years and older could convert 6,000 ostmarks. For cash and 
savings above these amounts the rate of 2:1 would apply. 
Mortgage and industrial debt would be converted at 2:1, but 
at the rate of 3:1 for ostmarks held outside the GDR. Non-
GDR citizens and entities with accounts in the GDR would be 
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given a rate of 3:1 based on the amount they held in 
ostmarks on December 31 1989. (United States Dept. of 
Commerce - American Embassy in Berlin 1990) 
As can be seen from the actual currency exchange 
specifics, the transaction rate of 1:1 :: EM:DM for initial 
exchanges and then 2 or 3 to 1 thereafter provided the East 
Germans with an opportunity for short-term gains and the 
German economy with a considerably increased monetary base. 
Typically the German Bundesbank has maintained a tight 
monetary policy in order to combat its inflationary 
concerns. Such an inevitable increase in the monetary base 
would probably raise fears of inflation which in turn would 
likely undermine the global perception of the deutschemark's 
stability. If Germany were not a country with an extremely 
strong anti-inflationary stance, investors' expected 
inflationary increase would simply be a direct function of 
their perceived increase in the monetary base. However, 
investors in the deutschemark also must consider the extent 
of Bundesbank intervention in domestic financial markets. 
Accordingly, after reunification one would expect 
investors to require additional compensation in the form of 
a risk premium for holding either spot or forward 
deutschemarks, not only because of expected increases in 
inflation but also because of a slight possibility of little 
or no inflation due to sterilization. It is this 
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anticipation of an increased risk premium due to perceptions 
about inflation and/or the amount of sterilization that the 
deutschemark has become riskier that will be examined during 
the course of this paper. 
3. Literature Review 
Due to extensive past studies, it is now commonly 
accepted that the forward discount is a biased predictor of 
future exchange rate changes (Hansen and Hodrick 1980, Cumby 
and Obstfeld 1982) . A common test (Fama 1984) for forward 
market bias is to regress the future change in the spot rate 
on the forward discount where 8S(t+k) is the percentage 
currency change (difference in the log of the spot price for 
foreign exchange) and FP(k,t) = F(k,t) - S(t) is the current 
k-period forward discount/premium (i.e., log of forward rate 
less the log of the spot rate); thus, 
5S(t+k) = a + P FP(k,t) + s(t+k) (1) 
where a = constant term 
k = k future periods from t 
s(t+k) is a random error term 
The null hypothesis of unbiasedness is that P = l a n d a = 0 . 
Previously conducted tests typically show p to be less 
than unity indicating a tendency of the forward rate to 
overpredict the future spot rate. The presence of 
11 
unbiasedness or "speculative efficiency" (Bilson 1981) 
implies a rejection of the joint hypothesis of market 
efficiency and no risk premium. 
Early tests of forward bias calculated the mean 
forecast error, S(t+1) - F(t), (Frankel 1980), and found it 
not significantly different from zero. It was concluded that 
such findings provided evidence of a zero risk premium. 
However, more recently, weight has been assigned to the fact 
that these results are also consistent with a risk premium 
that changes its sign and has a mean of zero. (Kaminsky and 
Peruga 1990) 
A difference of opinion arises from attempting to 
distinguish what is responsible for the rejection of the 
hypothesis of unbiasedness. It must be considered whether 
this forward bias is evidence of a risk premium or a 
breakdown of rational expectations theory or a combination 
of the two. 
If one were to assume that investors were risk neutral, 
then the systematic component of exchange rate changes in 
excess of the forward discount could be interpreted as 
evidence of a failure of rational expectations (Froot and 
Frankel 1989) . They further add that the same systematic 
component of unbiasedness has been thought to arise from a 
time varying risk premium that separates the forward 
discount from expected depreciation. It is this concept of a 
12 
time varying risk premium that will be of central concern in 
this analysis of the deutschemark. 
It is generally acknowledged that there is little 
empirical evidence in favor of a time varying risk premium. 
However that, in itself, does not constitute an outright 
rejection of the hypothesis. Many of the works taken from a 
portfolio balance model point of view reveal no evidence of 
a risk premium. Boothe and Longworth (1986) group models 
that allow for the existence of a risk premium into two 
groups: those that require the presence of outside assets to 
explain the existence of a risk premium and those that do 
not. The portfolio balance model falls into the former 
category. The author will be looking at a model that allows 
for the existence of a risk premium without reliance upon 
assets such as current and capital account figures that are 
incorporated in the portfolio balance approach. 
Although there may be little evidence to support it, 
the risk premium will continue to be a topic of serious 
discussion as it implies the verification of one of 
economics most basic premises - that agents act rationally. 
Boothe and Longworth and Hodrick and Srivastava (1984) found 
that other financial markets have shown an incorporation of 
a risk premium into their returns. One would, therefore, 
expect to find similar results in currency markets. Given an 
improvement in both data testing and gathering (namely 
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survey) data, it will more than likely be possible to prove 
or disprove the rational expectations assumption and the 
existence of a risk premium. 
A model that approaches the risk premium outside the 
framework of the portfolio balance model was presented by 
Domowitz and Hakkio (1985) . It suggests that not only is a 
risk premium required to explain deviations from simple 
market efficiency but that the risk premium should also be 
time varying. Their analysis of the risk premium depends on 
the conditional variances of the independent variables in a 
regression on the rate of forward premium depreciation. They 
found the German mark's estimated risk premium to frequently 
change from positive to negative in the presence of 
substantial movement of the conditional variance. Such 
movements in the risk premium would be consistent with 
Frenkel1s (1982) observations that the risk premium should 
fluctuate between negative and positive so that the absence 
of conditional bias can be adequately accounted. 
Another popular approach to addressing the risk premium 
question has been through the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH) where agents form their expectations rationally and 
are also risk neutral. 
In such a model, the risk premium (RP) can be expressed 
as 
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RP(t) = [F(t+1,t) - S(t)] - [S(e,t+1) - S(t)] (2) 
where: F(t+l,t) = t+1 Forward Rate in time t 
S(t) = Spot Rate at time t 
S(e,t+1) = t+1 Expected Spot Rate 
and will equal zero under the conditions of risk neutrality 
and rational expectations. 
Many such tests including a rejection of the EMH have 
assumed that investors do not make systematic forecasting 
errors and accordingly any systematic observed errors are 
due to risk factors. A number of authors have shown that 
under the assumption of risk neutrality agents are 
irrational (Bilson 1981) and that if one assumes agents to 
be both rational and risk averse then a risk premium does 
exist but cannot be specifically attributed to either 
factor. It hardly seems plausible for the two views to, in 
fact, be valid since both arguments used F(t + l,t) as their 
proxy for S(e,t+1) while differing only in their assumptions 
of risk neutral and risk averse investors. Therefore, they 
are not avoiding the jointness of the hypothesis (rational 
and risk averse investors) under consideration, since by 
substituting F(t+l,t) for S(e,t+1) one automatically assumes 
markets and hence investors to be rational. MacDonald and 
Torrance (1988) used weekly survey data to overcome this 
proxy problem and found that the forward rate was a biased 
predictor of the actual future spot rate for the 
deutschemark over the period 1985.02 to 1986.04. The use of 
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survey data allowed them to attribute this bias to the 
irrationality of investors. However, the use of survey data 
itself has frequently been criticized, and the authors 
acknowledge that in their sample there was a consensus view 
that at that time the dollar had depreciated "too far." This 
means that a dollar appreciation out of the sample validates 
the speculators' in-sample expectations. A further question 
then arises (which will not be adressed here) : to what 
extent are these expectations then validated? 
Given that our analysis will be based around 
conditions before and after a given event (reunification) , 
it would be prudent to consider implications from previous 
conditional variance tests for a risk premium. Kaminsky and 
Peruga (1990) point out that the risk premium will not be 
uniquely determined by the covariance of consumption, but 
could be influenced by the risk derived from the possibility 
of a changing exchange rate regime. This is analogous to the 
problem of out of sample expectations outlined above and is 
commonly referred to as the "peso problem," where long-term 
expected movements are not realized in the short-term thus 
investors may appear irrational in the short-term. 
If the dollar/deutschemark exchange rate were to follow 
a random walk with drift (ie., uncovered interest parity), 
the relationship could be shown in regression form as 
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S(t) = a S(t-l) + (3 (i - i1) (t-1) + u(t) (3) 
where: i = US interest rates 
i'= German interest rates. 
The joint hypothesis of uncovered interest rate parity and 
rational expectations implies that a=l, P=1 and u is a white 
noise error process (MacDonald 1988). 
Typically, it has been found that a and P are as 
expected but u is usually a non-white noise error term. As 
with the forward discount bias, such deviations are usually 
attributed to the existence of a variable risk premium 
(Cumby and Obstfeld 1981) or a breakdown in rational 
expectations. Should the above hypothesis not hold, further 
tests for a, p, and u will be performed in order to determine 
whether deviations from covered interest parity became 
structurally different before and after the period of 
reunification. 
4. Data Description 
The analysis is based on monthly data from 1973.01 to 
1993.02 which amounts to 240 observations in all. The data 
prior to unification contains 205 observations and is 
therefore a sufficiently large enough data set for 
comparisons to be made. March of 1973 was chosen as the 
starting point of my data set since all post WWII exchange 
rates quotes prior to this date are influenced (tainted) by 
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the Bretton Woods agreement on fixed exchange rates. 
February 12, 1973 saw the final collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system when Japan and European nations allowed their 
currencies to float freely. Thus, March of 1973 was the 
first postwar month containing flexible exchange rates. A 
further consideration does arise in the post-unification 
data set. The sample up to the end of 1992 contains only 35 
observations, a smaller number than would be ideally 
available, this is however unavoidable because the close 
proximity of the study simply makes any further observations 
impossible. 
An important concept to be considered lies in the 
dissolution of European economic barriers. As of January 
1st 1993, Germany and all its trade partners became active 
members in the European Economic Community. The dissolution 
of economic borders between the members of the EEC is 
expected to bring considerable economic gain in the form of 
free trade and standardized product taxes to the twelve 
member nations. It seems logical to deduce that if one were 
to prove that unification did indeed cause a significant 
change in the foreign exchange risk premium, then it is 
likely that the birth of the EC (and pure free-trade etc.) 
would exert some influence on currencies; and the question 
of a further change in the risk premium arises. Thus, by 
including 1993 data, it is arguable that one also would have 
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to address the same question twice since the data contains 
influences from the two events which are not mutually-
exclusive. For now, this concept will merely be afforded 
some consideration in my conclusions. The formation of the 
EEC had been common knowledge for approximately a decade 
before 1993, and accordingly it is arguable that any 
significant changes occurred as a result of official 
recognition of the EC in 1993. Similarly, if German 
unification took place over a number of years, there would 
probably be little or no structural break in any time series 
exchange rate model. 
Germany's current reluctance to break away from the ERM 
(even after Britain and Italy), is keeping the deutschemark 
at an artificial rate. Any post reunification (ex ante) 
observations that were to include current figures would 
first need to eliminate this effect. Using implied forward 
rates as has been done here is one way to deal with this 
issue. Otherwise, 35 or so observations may be all that is 
useable in testing the ex ante data. 
The variables consist of the log of the spot exchange 
rate (measured in dollars per Deutschemark) which is 
represented by S. The forward rate F(t+j,t) represents the 
forward rate for delivery in period t+j. Consequently, 
[F(t+j,t) - S(t)] is the forward premium which can also be 
expressed as FP(t+j,t). Comparable interest rates are drawn 
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from the U.S. 3-month bank certificates of deposit and a 
similar German commercial bank equivalent security, measured 
as i and i', respectively. All primary data sets were 
obtained through the National Trade Data Bank system. 
5. Uncovered Interest Rate Parity 
The Interest Rate Parity theorem (IRP) relates the 
discount or premium on forward exchange to the term 
structure of interest rates on financial assets. Briefly, 
IRP states that the forward and spot markets are so related, 
that an investor will be indifferent between 
borrowing/lending in either domestic or foreign currency, 
when considering currency exchange immediately in the spot 
market and exchange risk being covered by a reverse 
transaction in the forward market. Economic equilibrium is 
maintained where there is equality between the rates of 
return on domestic and covered foreign assets which can be 
expressed by the IRP condition: 
[ 1 + i(T/360)] 
FI(T,t) = S(t) (4) 
[ 1 + i'(T/360)] 
(The 360-day year is used in this equation since we are 
dealing with US dollars and German deutschemarks, both of 
which are quoted in 360-day year terms.) 
By applying the three-month certificate of deposit 
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yields, i and i' to the above condition, the x-month implied 
forward rate can be calculated and applied to the analysis. 
However, it should be noted that the IRP condition assumes 
the markets to be rational (all arbitrage opportunities 
exhausted), thus any forward bias could only be attributed 
to the presence of a risk premium as the possibility of the 
breakdown of rational expectations is overcome by this 
condition. 
Fama's (1984) test for forward market bias was 
conducted as 
Ss(t+k) = a + 3 FP(k,t) + s(t+k), (1) 
where the expected values for unbiasedness are a=0 and |3=1. 
Table 1 displays the results of the period 1973.03 
1990.03. The coefficient on the implied one-month forward 
discount (FP1) can be seen to have a value of -0.054 which 
is statistically different from zero, as it is from unity. 
The constant term is also shown to be different from zero. 
Similarly, the forward discount for the implied three-month 
rate (FP3) is a biased predictor of future spot rate changes 
as the coefficient on FP3 is -0.028, which is also 
significantly different from zero and one. The coefficient 
of the constant term is once again statistically different 
from zero. The results of the test using both one-and three-
month implied forward rates for the period 1973.03 
1993.02. are not shown here, but confirm the findings above. 
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Thus it can be deduced that the implied forward discount is 
a biased predictor of future exchange rate changes. 
TABLE 1 
Dependent Variable: Difference in Log of Spot Rate 
Sample Range: 1973.03 - 1990.03 
Number of Observations: 205 
Variable Coefficient Std Error T-Statistic 
C 0.0096 0 . 0031 3.0777 
FP1 -0.0540 0 . 0185 -2.9121 
C 0.0088 0 . 0032 2 .7551 
FP3 -0.0277 0 . 0112 -2.4754 
(FP1 and FP3 are expressed in logged terms.) 
Bilson (1981) noted that the presence of unbiasedness 
implied a rejection of the joint hypothesis of market 
efficiency and no risk premium. By using the implied forward 
rate (FI) from IRP we have (as stated previously) inherently 
assumed that there are no arbitrage opportunities and, 
hence, the market is acting efficiently. The question 
therefore arises whether this implied bias can be attributed 
solely to an implied risk premium. 
As mentioned earlier, another common approach to 
addressing the risk premium has been through the 
incorporation of the EMH, wherein investors are assumed to 
act rationally and are risk neutral. Because of this 
rational investor assumption, incorporating IRP into the 
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model is consistent with this approach; and the previous 
problem of attempting to attribute failure of the EMH to a 
risk premium or breakdown of rational expectations is now 
overcome. IRP implicitly assumes rational investors and, 
consequently, systematic prediction errors in EMH can be 
attributed to a risk premium. 
By removing ourselves from the possibility that agents 
can act irrational (by definition of IRP) , we hope to have 
alienated any fluctuations sufficiently enough to attribute 
them to changes in the risk premium. 
Having calculated the implied forward rate, the now 
inherent assumption of rational expectations is used to form 
the model for identifying the presence of a non-zero risk 
premium. 
Because of rational expectations, the spot rate will 
equal its expected value plus a random error term and can be 
shown as S(t+1) = E(t) S(t+1) + s(t), where E(t) S(t+1) is 
the expected value of the spot rate in the period (t+1). In 
efficient currency markets, it is the forward rate that 
equals the expected future spot rate and with risk averse 
investors who require a risk premium. Foreign exchange 
market efficiency can be shown as follows: E(t) S(t+l) = 
F(t) + RP, where RP equals the risk premium. 
By applying the implied forward rate to the above two 
equations the following equation is derived: 
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S(t+1) = FI(T,t) + RP + e(t+l) (5) 
where FI(T,t) is the implied forward rate as calculated 
above. What concerns us is whether or not RP can be shown to 
be non-zero. 
That is, the null hypothesis is that 
Ho: RP = 0, 
while the alternative hypothesis is 
HI: RP does not equal 0. 
To test the previous equation, the following linear 
regression will be run: 
S(t) = a + p [FI (T, t-1) ] + s (t) . (6) 
Testing will be performed to determine whether the null 
hypothesis, which in this regression is shown as a=0 and 
P = l , can be rejected. Unless both conditions are met, the 
null hypothesis must be rejected. The risk premium is a non-
measurable quantity (with current statistical techniques and 
data generating procedures). Accordingly one cannot simply 
run a linear regression to determine its magnitude. By using 
equation (6) to test for a risk premium, we hope to find 
evidence of a missing variable. It has already been 
established that a breakdown of this equation (and equation 
(1) ) is due either to irrational investors or to a risk 
premium and the inclusion of the implied forward rate has 
eliminated the possibility of irrational markets. Therefore 
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rejection of the null hypothesis (partial evidence of a 
missing variable) can only be attributed to the presence of 
a risk premium. 
Similarly, the joint condition of a=0 and P = 1 can also 
be tested by an examination of the residuals of the above 
regression. The dependent variable simply becomes 
S(t + 1) - FI(T,t) = u (t + 1) (7) 
and a test is conducted to determine whether the residuals 
are in fact white noise. A conclusion of a non-white noise 
error term will lead us to reject the null hypothesis of no 
risk premium. 
It should be pointed out that this study is based 
largely on IRP and equation (6) . Although a number of tests 
are run on the data, they are mainly a deviation of (6) and 
serve to make any findings thereof more robust. 
6. Data Analysis 
By obtaining the implied forward rate (FI) we can 
compare the period prior to unification to the period after 
it. On the regression S(t) = a + P[FI(t-l)] + u(t), we can 
test for the presence of a risk premium by testing for a=0 
and P=l. If the risk premium (RP) equals zero then the 
above condition will hold because with rational markets and 
risk neutrality (or no perceived risk considering risk 
aversion) the implied forward rate in time t will equal the 
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spot rate in t + 1. If the above condition does not hold, 
then we must consider the probability of a non-zero risk 
premium. 
Because we are working with implied (theoretical) 
forward rates, it is possible to calculate any x-month 
forward rate. Only two "reasonable" x-month forward rates 
were considered: namely, the one-and the three-month rates. 
The one-month forward rate was, in general, a better 
predictor of future spot rates. Accordingly, the one-month 
rate better represents market efficiency and would therefore 
be a better proxy for expected future spot rates than would 
the three-month rate. 
Actual incorporation of East Germany into West Germany 
took place on October 3, 1990. A model that better reflects 
the explanatory power of the implied forward rate 
incorporates the beginning of the post reunification period 
being in April as opposed to September 1990. The reasoning 
behind this "split date" of March 1990 is that during April 
1990 the official transfer exchange rate of 1:1 :: EM:DM was 
made official. Any investor either buying or selling 
Deutschemarks after the announcement would have to consider 
the inevitable forthcoming increased world supply of 
Deutschemarks. Thus if an investor were to take any action 
regarding the Deutschemark, it would be well before the 
political unification that followed in October. 
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A question arises regarding the number of post 
unification observations. Because these events are rather 
recent, there only 35 observations available since the 
"split date." (Only 28 if one were to consider October as 
being the relevant date.) Accordingly, conclusions reached 
about changes in the Deutschemark after reunification should 
perhaps be accorded some degree of consideration. The fact 
that the 35 observations provide at least 20 degrees of 
freedom which makes the tests workable does allow one to put 
some weight behind the conclusions reached. 
With the exchange transfer announcement coming mid-
April 1990, it could be argued that the end of April would 
have been a more accurate "split date" than the end of 
March. The March date was chosen for two reasons: l)it was 
felt that rumors circulating at the beginning of April were 
fairly accurate, and therefore less likely to bias any 
results than would the inclusion of post-announcement 
activity with pre-announcement data even though there were a 
large number of observations,- and 2) it allows us one more 
observation of post reunification data. 
An examination of the regression shown in (6) on the 
one-month implied forward rate prior to April 1990 reveals 
that a=-0.36 with a t-statistic of -18.853 (hereafter 
shown in parentheses following the coefficient's value) and 
therefore differs significantly from zero. The coefficient P 
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was found to equal 0.6463 (24.038) and is not only 
significantly different from zero but it also differs from 
one as the 95% confidence interval for P is 0.6463 + -
0.0527. The R-squared value of 0.740 indicates that the 
implied forward rate was an extremely good predictor of 
future spot rates, prior to April 1990. Further, the F-
statistic of 577.82 indicates the significance of both the 
implied forward rate and the constant (intercept) terms in 
the model. These figures are reported in Table 2 where LFI = 
Log of the implied rate. 
TABLE 2 
Dependent Variable: S (Log of Spot Rate) 
Sample Range: 1973.03 - 1990.03 
Number of Observations: 205 
Variable Coefficient Std Error T-Statistic 
C -0.3643 0.0193 -18.8534 
LFI(-l) 0.6463 0.0269 24.0379 
R-Squared: 0.740 Adjusted R-Squared: 0 . 739 
Durbin-Watson: 0.239 RSS: 1.625 
F-Statistic: 577.82 
The period after reunification (1990.04-1993.02) shows 
that a=-0.404 (-7.846) and p has a value of 0.106 (1.363). 
Further, P is not significantly different from zero at the 
5% or 10% level of significance. After reunification the R-
squared of the same model drops to 0.053 with an adjusted R-
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squared of 0.025. This decline in the predictive power of 
the model is attributable to the insignificance of the 
implied forward rate variable after April 1990. Consistent 
with such a decline is the low F-statistic of 1.858. Results 
are shown in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 
Dependent Variable: S (Log of Spot Rate) 
Sample Range: 1990.04 - 1993.02 
Number of Observations: 35 
Variable Coefficient Std Error T-Statistic 
C -0.4040 0.5149 -7.8465 
LFI(-l) 0.1058 0.0776 1.3632 
R-Squared: 0.053 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.025 
Durbin-Watson: 0.293 RSS: 0.105 
F-Statistic: 1.858 
Over the entire data range of 1973.03 - 1993.02, the R-
squared value of 0.57 and F-statistic of 310 are of little 
value since they are merely a combination of the extremely 
good and an extremely poor predictive power the independent 
variable exhibited, of future spot rates. 
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TABLE 4 
Dependent Variable: S (Log of Spot Rate) 
Sample Range: 1973.03 - 1993.02 
Number of Observations: 240 
Variable Coefficient Std Error T-Statistic 
C -0.320 0 . 030 -10.714 
LFI(-1) 0 . 645 0 . 042 15 .377 
R-Squared: 0.498 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.496 
Durbin-Watson: 0.087 RSS: 4.774 
F-Statistic: 236.44 
To eliminate this combination of data ranges containing 
a poor and a strong predictive element of future spot rates 
by the independent variable, a dummy variable was 
incorporated into the model. Prior to April 1990 the dummy 
variable was assigned a value of zero and a value of one 
thereafter. The regression can be shown as follows: 
S(t) = a + P Fl(t-l) + (|> D (8) 
where D = Dummy variable 
Most impressive is that now the R-squared is 0.806 over the 
entire period of 1973.03 - 1993.02. In addition, a=-0.38 
(-20.241), while P = 0 . 6 2 1 (23.758) but is significantly 
different from one. The coefficient on the dummy variable is 
0.313 (23.96) indicating, a structural change in the 
composition of the spot rate at the time of reunification. 
The F-statistic is 493.38, indicating significance of all 
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the independent variables. 
TABLE 5 
Dependent Variable: S (Log of Spot Rate) 
Sample Range: 1973.03 - 1993.02 
Number of Observations: 240 
Variable Coefficient Std Error T-Statistic 
C -0.3814 0.0188 -20 .2416 
FI (-1) 0.6213 0.0261 23 . 7582 
D 0.3135 0.0161 19 .4138 
R-Squared: 0.806 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.805 
Durbin-Watson: 0.261 RSS: 1.843 
F-Statistic: 493.38 
Another method of determining whether there was a 
structural break in the composition of the deutschemark is 
to apply the Chow test to equation (6), the results of which 
are shown in Tables 2,3 and 4. It is the Residual Sum of 
Squares (RSS) that will be of concern here. The calculated 
F-value with k=2 and (N1 + N2 - 2k) = 236 is 217.43. The 
critical value F(2,236) ~ F(2,200) = 3.04. Because 217.43 > 
3.04 we can confirm our conclusion found using the dummy 
variable. There was a change in at least one component of 
the deutschemark. The only two variable components that are 
not explicitly included in the model are the rationality of 
investors and the risk premium. We have already alleviated 
the possibility of irrational investors and accordingly one 
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can conclude that there was a change in the risk premium 
after the reunification of Germany. 
The author suggests that the risk premium did in fact 
increased after German reunification. The presence of a risk 
premium was detected by evidence of its omission in the 
various regressions that were run. After reunification, 
equation (6) was no longer even an adequate predictor of 
future spot rates indicating the omission of at least one 
significant independent variable. Assuming the model was 
missing no other independent variables besides the risk 
premium (and the author has no reason to think otherwise) , 
then the risk premium now exerts a larger influence on the 
determination of spot rates than prior to German 
reunification. Similarly, if the post reunification risk 
premium had in fact become zero, then the models would no 
longer exhibit the properties of a specification bias due to 
an omitted variable. If such were to be the case, it seems 
logical to deduce that, because the specification bias 
seemed to get worse after March 1990, the risk premium can 
be said to have increased with respect to the pre-
unification risk premium. 
The three regressions presented above exhibit positive 
serial correlation (with Durbin-Watson statistics of no 
greater than 0.30). Accordingly, the reliability of the 
above regression is likely to be overstated, and it is not 
32 
considered the best estimator of the dependent variable. For 
our analysis, this overstating is of little or no concern. 
Efficient markets, which we have inherently assumed in 
deriving our implied forward rate, also assume semi-strong 
form efficiency for financial markets. This definition means 
that we have already assumed that all previous and presently 
available information is included in our calculated forward 
rate. To attempt to correct for autocorrelation by including 
any dependent variable lags would be, by definition, an 
inconsistency in our testing methods. For this reason alone, 
there is little that can be or should be done in the model 
to avoid any positive serial correlation. 
It would probably be surprising if positive serial 
correlation were not detected. The above tests have shown 
that the stated condition wherein investors are rational and 
there is no risk premium does not hold (which I believe is 
due to the presence of a non-zero risk premium) . The 
exclusion of a significant variable (albeit nonmeasurable) 
is likely to bias the errors toward being serially 
correlated. 
In addition to the above test for determining whether 
the null hypothesis of RP = 0 should be rejected or not, one 
could also examine the residuals using S(t+1) - FI(t) 
u(t+l). As explained previously, if the residuals are white 
noise in the equation then the null hypothesis of RP = 0 
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cannot be rejected. The autocorrelations of the dependent 
variable were tested by use of the Box-Pierce Q-statistic. 
Under the null hypothesis, the Q-statistic follows a Chi-
squared distribution, but since we have over 100 degrees of 
freedom we could also use a standard normal distribution. 
For the entire data range of 1973.03 to 1993.02 the 
dependent variable exhibited a Q-statistic of 1467.8. At the 
5% significance level and 100 degrees of freedom, the 
critical Chi-squared value is 124.3. These results translate 
to a zero probability of the series being considered as 
white noise over the range of data. 
The Q-statistic for the period 1973.03 - 1990.03 is 
shown to be 572.1, while the Q-statistic for the period 
1990.04 - 1993.02 is 166.5. Consequently, neither series can 
be considered as white noise at the 5% (or the 1%) 
significance level, and the null hypothesis of RP = 0 can be 
rejected in this context. The evidence of autocorrelations 
is further evidence of the probability of an omitted 
variable in the regression above. 
7. Conclusion 
Ideally, it would be possible to take actual forward 
and spot rates and determine whether or not a change in the 
risk premium for the deutschemark was present after German 
reunification had occurred. Because the existence of a risk 
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premium and the breakdown of rational expectations are 
indistinguishable in being the cause of any structural 
change in the deutschemark, actual forward rates prove to be 
of little use in detecting the presence of a risk premium. 
By incorporating interest rate parity, it becomes possible 
to isolate changes in the risk premium through a detected 
structural change in the interest rate parity condition. 
This approach was undertaken and it was found that the 
reunification of Germany did in fact cause a change in the 
risk premium of the deutschemark. 
Given the evolution of statistical testing methods, it 
will (probably) become possible to use actual forward rates 
to isolate the risk premium and detect changes in its 
magnitude. Until then we are reduced to using survey data 
and implied forward rates. However with the advent of the 
ERM (and currencies being on and off it) , one must wonder 
whether these will provide a helpful inroad to gaining a 
more thorough understanding of this complex relationship. 
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